Permissions are highly sensitive in Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications, as IoT devices collect our personal data and control the safety of our environment. Rather than simply granting permissions, further constraints shall be imposed on permission usage so as to realize the Principle of Least Privilege. Since IoT devices are physically embedded, they are often accessed in a particular sequence based on their relative physical positions. Monitoring if such sequencing constraints are honoured when IoT devices are accessed provides a means to fence off malicious accesses. This paper proposes a history-based capability system, HCAP, for enforcing permission sequencing constraints in a distributed authorization environment. We formally establish the security guarantees of HCAP, and empirically evaluate its performance.
INTRODUCTION
Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices collect our personal data (e.g., wearables, sensors) and control the safety of our environment (e.g., thermostat, smart locks). Granting permissions to access IoT devices often comes with significant privacy, security and even safety implications. Yet, authority delegation is a common use case in IoT applications. For example, envision the wide deployment of smart locks on an organization campus. Permissions to unlock various Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. SACMAT '18, June [13] [14] [15] 2018 entrances must now be properly granted to members of that organization. In this work, we are concerned with the potential misuse of permissions by users of IoT devices.
Rather than simply granting permissions, further usage constraints shall be imposed on permissions in order to rule out potentially malicious usage patterns. Simple examples of this would include contextual constraints such as not allowing entry after midnight. Such constraints are a way of realizing the Principle of Least Privilege [33] . But we can do even better than contextual constraints. Since IoT devices are physically embedded, they are often accessed in a particular sequence based on their relative physical positions. Monitoring if such sequencing constraints are honoured provides a means to fence off malicious accesses to devices. Example 1.1 (Physical Embeddedness). Alice often stays after office hour, when all the doors of her organization are locked. Special permissions are granted to her to unlock certain doors. When Alice leaves for the day, she passes through entrances A, B and C (corresponding respectively to the lab door, the computer science building entrance, and the campus gate) in that physical order. Not only does Alice require the permissions to unlock the smart locks at A, B and C, ordering constraints shall also be imposed so that, during off hours, C (campus gate) is not unlocked before the authorization system registering her unlocking A (lab door) and B (building entrance). Directly unlocking C (campus gate) without going through A (lab door) and B (building entrance) could very well mean her smartphone has been picked up by an unauthorized party trying to enter the campus from the outside.
Permission sequencing constraints are also important when device accesses must conform to a workflow specification. Kortuem et al. use the term process awareness to refer to the ability of smart objects to guide their users in following operational procedures [21] . Procedure guiding is envisioned to be a key feature of, say, smart construction objects [29] . Example 1.2 (Process Awareness). Suppose an industrial process follows an explicitly articulated workflow, in which two conceptual steps, S 1 and S 2 , are sequentially ordered. Permissions to operate equipments are assigned to each step [9, 41] : e.g., permissions p 1 and p 2 can be exercised in step S 1 , and permissions p 2 and p 3 can be exercised in step S 2 . The permission assignment and the ordering of workflow steps jointly induce sequencing constraints on permission usage: Once p 3 is exercised, it is obvious that S 2 is being executed, and thus p 1 shall no longer be allowed (i.e., no p 1 after p 3 ). Violation of this sequencing constraint is a sign of equipment misuse.
request is a function of the access history. HBAC policies can be imposed to restrict permission usage once an access pattern has been detected (no p 1 after p 3 ). This feature can be leveraged for enforcing the following forms of permission usage control. Example 1.3 (Permission Usage Control). Suppose a campus visitor is only allowed to access a facility (e.g., a smart coffee dispenser) no more than four times during her visit. In other words, we want the authorization system to deny the usage of a permission after it has been exercised for a number of times. In short, permissions are seen as consumable resources. A second form of permission usage constraint is the cardinality constraint, which demands that no more than k of the permissions in a set P can be exercised [34] . In the special case of |P | = 2 and k = 1, the constraint enforces permission-level mutual exclusion. Similarly, the Chinese Wall policy [8] can be seen as a third form of permission usage constraints: Once a resource has been accessed, access to resources in conflict with the former will be denied.
Enforcing HBAC policies requires support from the authorization system. The growing scale of smart devices and casual users makes it necessary for device administrators to be able to manage access control policies centrally, while enabling devices to enforce such policies in a decentralized manner (i.e., without the mediation of a centralized reference monitor). Typically, an unforgeable capability (aka security token) is issued by a centralized authorization server to a client, who in turn presents the capability to the resource custodian as a proof of authorization. Examples of such distributed capability systems include the Identity-based Capability System (ICAP) [16] , CapaFS [32] , O'Auth [18] , OpenID [31], and Macaroons [5] . The dual requirements of centralized policy administration and decentralized policy enforcement are the main driver behind the recent push by access management solution providers [15, 30] to adopt the User-Managed Access standard [27] as the choice platform for access management in IoT applications. More generally, distributed capability systems have emerged as a popular choice for decentralized access control in the IoT literature [17, 19, 26] . Unfortunately, none of the distributed capability systems surveyed above offers adequate support for HBAC. The crux of the problem is that policy enforcement in HBAC is a stateful process. A traditional capability, however, captures a static set of authorized permissions. Such capabilities will have to be revoked and reissued by the centralized authorization server whenever the state of HBAC enforcement changes, causing the authorization server to be contacted frequently, thereby nullifying the benefit of decentralized access control promised by distributed capability systems.
This paper proposes a History-Based Capability System, HCAP, for regulating the order in which permissions are exercised in a distributed authorization environment. HCAP is an extension of ICAP [16] . HCAP capabilities carry sequencing constraints in the form of security automata (SA) [35] . Exercising a permission produces an SA state transition, invalidates the existing capability, and generates a new capability reflecting the new SA state. Since the proposed scheme minimizes communication with the central authorization server, and does not require the IoT devices to know about the access control policies, HCAP makes a good building block for UMA-style combination of centralized policy administration and decentralized policy enforcement. We claim four contributions:
(1) We describe the design of HCAP, a distributed capability system that can enforce history-based access control policies (see §3). (2) We formally establish the security guarantees of HCAP in the form of a safety property and a liveness property (see §4). (3) In the formulation of core HCAP, it is assumed that the permissions associated with an SA are all related to a single device. We propose an extension to HCAP that relaxes this restriction, thereby allowing an SA to regulate the permission usage of multiple devices (see §5). (4) We empirically evaluate the performance of HCAP (see §6).
RELATED WORK
There are two kinds of distributed authorization system [37] . The first kind are the credentials-based authorization systems (F. Schneider's terminology), in which the client presents a set of certificates to an authorization system as a proof of policy compliance [1] [2] [3] 24] . The certificates in the compliance proof are typically issued by different authorities, and each certificate corresponds to an assertion in a logical language used for specifying conditions of authorization. The authorization system is presumed to know the access control policy, which is specified in the aforementioned logical language. The second kind are the distributed capability systems, in which the authorization system, upon successful check of policy compliance, issues to the client an unforgeable capability (aka security token) [5, 16, 18, 31, 32] . The client then presents the capability to resource custodians to gain access without further mediation of the authorization system. The resource custodians are thus freed from needing to know and manage the access control policies. This work contributes to the literature of the second kind. To the best of our knowledge, HCAP is the first distributed capability system to support History-Based Access Control (HBAC). We advocate the employment of this feature for sequencing permission usage in IoT environments.
HCAP is an extension of ICAP [16] in order to enforce HBAC policies. While an ICAP capability carries the list of granted permissions, an HCAP capability carries a partial specification of an SA, which we call an SA fragment. In the degenerate case when the SA has only one state, an HCAP capability is structurally equivalent to an ICAP capability. Another point of comparison concerns the exceptions. Exceptions are created in ICAP when the authorization server informs the resource server of capability revocations. In HCAP, an exception is created when the resource server exercises a permission that leads to SA state transition, thereby invalidating an existing capability. In addition, HCAP exceptions are much more complex: each exception chronicles the history of SA state transition, rather than a single event of revocation.
ICAP has also been extended by Mahalle et al. for IoT applications [26] . Their extension does not support HBAC.
The State-Modifying Policy (SMP) language is an authorization logic that supports the specification of changes to the protection state as a result of authorization [4] . SMP is designed particularly for HBAC policies. Its enforcement model, however, assumes a centralized resource guard (aka PEP), and is therefore incapable of supporting decentralized access control in the manner of HCAP.
In history-based access control, the history of access is tracked by a reference monitor, and this access history forms the basis of making authorization decisions [12, 13, 22, 25, 35, 39, 40] . Schneider proved that only safety properties are enforceable using a reference monitor that tracks execution history, and proposed the Security Automata as an automata-theoretic representation of reference monitors [35] . In this work, permission sequencing constraints are encoded as a Security Automaton and embedded in a capability. State transition occurs when the capability is presented to a resource custodian, who may not immediately relay this change back to the central authorization server. The representation of the current automaton state is therefore distributed across multiple participants. The technical challenge addressed by HCAP are (a) to ensure the coherence of this distributed representation, (b) to provably prevent replay attacks, and (c) to achieve the above while minimizing communications with the authorization server.
A HISTORY-BASED CAPABILITY SYSTEM 3.1 Overview
Protocol Participants. We envision a distributed authorization system akin to UMA [27] , consisting of resource servers, clients and an authorization server.
Resource servers. Each resource server encapsulates a number of resources within a single device, and acts as their custodian. For example, a smart weather station tracks a number of weather readings, each considered a separate resource. Operations can be performed on the resources. In the smart weather station, an operation for a given weather reading (e.g., temperature) can be "retrieve" or "post reading to Facebook." A permission is an operation-resource pair. An access request is a request for the resource server to exercise a permission: i.e., perform the operation on the resource.
Clients. Clients are users who, mediated by software systems (e.g., smartphone apps), direct access requests to resource servers.
Authorization server. The authorization server is responsible for access management. Administrators of resource servers and their resources may specify access control policies to indicate which permission is granted to which client. We assume that an Application Programming Interface (API) is in place for an administrator to specify resources and operations to be protected. What is unique in HCAP is that the access control policy not only grants a set of permissions to a client, but also prescribes constraints on the order in which the permissions are to be exercised. As we shall see below, such constraints will take the form of a security automaton [35] .
The authorization server issues capabilities [10] to clients, who in turn present the capabilities to resource servers.
Trust Assumptions. The following are assumed. (1) The authorization server and resource servers are trusted parties. (2) Clients are not trusted: they actively attempt to forge, share with others, or replay capabilities (and other tickets). They are also unreliable: they may lose capabilities (and other tickets) that have been issued to them. (3) A public key infrastructure (PKI) is in place, so that the authorization server and the resource servers can authenticate one another, as well as the identity claims of clients. It is assumed that the authorization server can verify membership of the resource servers and clients that belong to the organization. (4) Each resource server has established a shared secret with the authorization server.
(5) Devices are equipped with a secure untamperable hardware that holds their secret values. (6) We assume a central clock that is used to synchronize all individual clocks in the system, and assume entities communicate over secure channel.
Design Objectives. HCAP is designed with the following objectives in mind.
O1 Resource servers shall not maintain knowledge of client identities and sequencing constraints. The authorization server alone is responsible for access management. In other words, when access control policies evolve, the resource servers do not need to be reconfigured.
O2 Communication with the authorization server shall be minimized, because that server is a communication bottleneck. A protocol in which every access request is mediated by the authorization server is considered a non-solution.
O3 The computational demand for resource servers shall be minimized, as these servers are hosted on IoT devices that may have limited computational capabilities.
Solution Approach. The sequencing constraints for permissions are essentially safety properties [23] , encoded as security automata (an automata-theoretic representation of reference monitors) [35] . When a client initiates a protocol session, a security automaton is started to monitor the order in which permissions are exercised in that session. The authorization server tracks the current state of that automaton. Since the resource server does not know the security automaton (O1), and the authorization server shall not be involved in policy mediation (O2), part of or all of the security automaton is carried in the capability. When the client presents the capability to a resource server for gaining access, the resource server simulates the automaton's state transition. State transition is not communicated immediately to the authorization server (O2). Instead, the resource server records the state transition, and issues a new capability to the client (while revoking the previous one). To conserve the computational resources of the resource server, the HCAP protocol has the resource server flushes its record of state transitions back to the authorization server from time to time, a process known as garbage collection (O3). For the same reason, the capability may not carry the full specification of the security automaton, thereby making capability processing lightweight (O3).
As the knowledge of the authorization server in the automaton state may lag behind the state transitions carried out remotely by resource servers, the current state of the security automaton is a datum distributed between the authorization server and the resource servers. The design of HCAP ensures the coherence of this distributed representation of the automaton state, and that outdated capabilities are not replayed by the client to gain access illegally.
Core HCAP. To facilitate presentation, this and the next section will present core HCAP, in which there is only one resource server. The extension of core HCAP to handle multiple resource servers is deferred to §5.
Preliminaries. We write dom(f ) and ran(f ) respectively for the domain and range of function f . A partial function f : A ↛ B is a function f with domain A ′ ⊆ A and codomain B. A finite partial function (i.e., finite domain) is also called a map.
Building Blocks
Security Automata. A security automaton is an automata-theoretic encoding of a safety property [35] . Here, we adopt the finitary variant of deterministic security automaton as defined by Fong [13] . A Deterministic Finite Security Automaton (DFSA), or simply Security Automaton (SA) in this work, is a tuple (Σ, Q, q 0 , δ ), where Σ is a finite set of permissions, Q is a finite set of automaton states, q 0 ∈ Q is an initial state, and δ : Q × Σ ↛ Q is a partial transition function (i.e., δ (q, p) may be undefined for some pair of state q ∈ Q and permission p ∈ Σ). An SA is essentially like a deterministic finite automaton in which every state is a final state. An SA accepts a sequence of permissions so long as the transition function defines a transition for every step. Policy violation is detected when there is no transition for a permission in the current state. For instance, the two SA below enforce the policies described in Example 1.1 (left) and Example 1.2 (right).
When the SA M is in a state q, the permissions that bring M back to q are stationary permissions, and the permissions that cause a transition to a different state are transitioning permissions. We
Tickets. The authorization server and resource server issue tickets to the client, who in turn uses them to justify requests. To ensure ticket authenticity and non-transferability, each ticket carries an authentication tag obtained from (a) the shared secret k between the authorization server and the resource server (trust assumption 4 in §3.1), and (b) the client identity uid. In this work, we follow the lightweight tagging mechanism of ICAP [16] . Suppose α is an assertion, the ticket ⟨⟨α⟩⟩ k,uid derived from secret key k for client uid is α | h(α | uid | k), where h is a hash function and "x | y" means the concatenation of x and y. Upon receiving a ticket ⟨⟨α⟩⟩ ?,? from a client uid, the resource server can check the ticket's authenticity by checking that the hash value in ⟨⟨α⟩⟩ ?,? is equal to h(α | uid | k). The use of uid to compute the hash value also ensures that the ticket is non-transferrable.
There are two kinds of ticket, capabilities and update requests, which we introduce in turn.
Capabilities. Capabilities are tickets issued by either the authorization server or the resource server to assert that certain permissions can be exercised by the client. A client may present an access request along with the capability to gain access. A capability issued to client uid for session sessid has the form ⟨⟨sessid : cap(t ser , F )⟩⟩ k,uid . Every capability asserts that the SA is in a certain state q, and thus some corresponding permissions can be exercised for sessid. The timestamp t ser , also called the serial number of the capability, identifies q indirectly by identifying the time when the SA entered into state q. The component F is an SA fragment, which identifies the permissions (stationary and transitioning) allowed in state q, as well as the transitions emanating from q. In some sense, an SA fragment is a partial specification of the SA, with current state q (formal definition to be given below). The specification is partial, because the authorization server is not obligated to encode the entire SA in one capability. This may be because full encoding causes the capability to be bloated, or because the authorization server desires to be synchronized with the resource server more often, or because the underlying communication protocol limits the capability size.
SA Fragments. An SA fragment is a representation of two things: (a) a (possibly incomplete) transition diagram, and (b) the current state of the transition diagram. States in the transition diagram are identified by symbolic names. We assume there is a countably infinite set N of symbolic names as well as a distinct marker • (pronounced 'unknown') such that • N . An SA fragment F is a pair (defs, n ⋆ ). The component defs is a finite partial function in which dom(defs) ⊂ N identifies the states of a transition diagram. For each name n ∈ dom(defs), defs(n) specifies the transitions emanating from the state with name n. More specifically, defs(n) is a pair (SP, trans), so that SP ⊆ Σ is the set of stationary permissions of n, and trans : Σ ↛ N ∪ {•} maps each transitioning permission of n to either a next state or the marker •. When trans(p) = •, the transition diagram permits the transition but does not identify the next state of the transition (thus F is a fragment rather than a complete SA). We further require that SP ∩ dom(trans) = ∅, and ran(trans) \ {•} ⊆ dom(defs). Lastly, the second component n ⋆ of F identifies the current state of the transition diagram, such that n ⋆ ∈ dom(defs). It is easy to see that one can use an SA fragment to partially specify an SA (i.e., a subset of states plus a subset of transitions). An SA fragment can be encoded as a JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) object in a straightforward manner [11] .
Transitions can be computed efficiently when SA fragments are encoded in JSON. Given an SA fragment F = (defs, n ⋆ ) for which
Our security guarantees depend on the condition that the SA fragments embedded in capabilities are "conservative" partial specification of the corresponding SA: i.e., the SA fragment does not allow transitions that are not supported by the corresponding SA, a notion that we formalize in the following. Let F = (defs, n ⋆ ) be an SA fragment, M = (Σ, Q, q 0 , δ ) be an SA, and q ∈ Q be an SA state. Then F is safe for M in state q if and only if there exists a function π : dom(defs) → Q such that (a) π (n ⋆ ) = q, and (b) for every n ∈ dom(defs), where defs(n) = (SP, trans), the three conditions below hold: (i) SP ⊆ stat M (π (n)); (ii) dom(trans) ⊆ trans M (π (n)); (iii) for every p ∈ dom(trans), either trans(p) = • or π (trans(p)) = δ (π (n), p).
Then the following properties hold:
Update Requests. A second kind of ticket is an update request, which has the form ⟨⟨sessid : upd(e)⟩⟩ k,uid . An update request is issued by the resource server, asserting that since last synchronized with the authorization server, e is the list of transitioning permissions that have been exercised by the resource server for the session sessid. The construct e is called an exception, for it describes how the knowledge of the authorization server has been out of sync.
Exceptions. An exception e records the history of the resource server having exercised certain permissions in the past. It is defined inductively as follows:
where p ∈ Σ and t ∈ N. Essentially, e is a list of permissiontimestamp pairs. Each pair contains a permission p and the time t at which p was exercised. The permissions are listed in descending order of time (more recent ones are listed first). We write times(e) for the set of all timestamps appearing in e, as well as first(e) and last(e) respectively for the minimum (least recent) and maximum (most recent) timestamps in times(e).
We write δ * (q, e) to signify the SA state obtained by starting at state q and exercising the permissions of e in chronological order. That is, δ * (q, nil(t)) = q, and δ * (q, ex(p, t, e)) = δ (δ * (q, e), p). δ * is undefined if one of the recursive calls is undefined.
A similar notation, ∆ * (F , e), can also be defined for SA fragments: ∆ * (F , nil(t)) = F , and ∆ * (F , ex(p, t, e)) = ∆(∆ * (F , e), p). As expected, ∆ * (F , e) is not defined if the nested calls are not defined, or if they return •.
Sometimes we want to apply only some of the transitions in an exception list to an SA fragment.
Protocol Description
Server Internal States. The authorization server and the resource server maintain a shared secret k. In addition, the authorization server maintains three maps for session administration: 
The resource server maintains two pieces of information: (a) a timestamp t rs , which marks the minimum serial number of capabilities that the server considers valid, and (b) a map ex[·], which records, for each known session ID sessid, the exception that chronicles the transitioning permissions the resource server has exercised since the SA of sessid has entered the state state[sessid].
Session Initialization. A client uid who intends to access a resource server shall first authenticate itself to the authorization server, and then request the initiation of a new protocol session for that resource server. The authorization server will consult an Algorithm 1: Authorization procedure of the resource server.
Input: A client access request (uid, p, cap), where uid is the client's authenticated identity, p is the permission to be exercised, and cap is a capability ⟨⟨sessid : cap(t ser , F )⟩⟩ ?,? for session sessid, such that F = (defs, n ⋆ ) and defs(n ⋆ ) = (SP, trans).
Output: A set of tickets, or a failure response. Data: The resource server maintains the following persistent data: (a) a secret k it shares with the authorization server, (b) a timestamp t rs , and (c) a map ex[·] that assigns an exception to each known session ID. 1 if cap is not signed by k for uid, or t ser < t rs then 2 return failure access control policy, and decide if access shall be granted. 1 If the authorization decision is positive, a new session ID sessid is created. The access control policy will grant a set Σ of permissions to the session, and also prescribe an SA M = (Σ, Q, q 0 , δ ) to regulate the order in which permissions are to be exercised within that session. The session sessid is initialized as follows:
The capability ⟨⟨sessid : cap(t ser , F )⟩⟩ k,uid is then issued to client uid, where k is the shared secret between the authorization and the resource server, t ser = serial[sessid], and F = fragment[M, q 0 ].
Authorization. The client uid requests the resource server to exercise a permission p by presenting a triple (uid, p, ⟨⟨sessid : cap(t ser , F )⟩⟩ ?,? ), where the capability is the justification for access. The identity of uid is first authenticated, and then the request is authorized according to Algorithm 1. The resource server first checks the authenticity of the capability (line 1). It also rejects capabilities with serial numbers earlier than t rs . As we shall see below, t rs is the time of the last garbage collection, whereby the authorization server and the resource server synchronize their knowledge of the SA's current states. Such a synchronization invalidates all capabilities with serial numbers earlier than t rs .
The serial number of the capability is then compared to last(ex[sessid]) in lines 3-6. The goal is to see how current the capability is in comparison to the knowledge of the resource server. Line 3 corresponds to the case when the capability is issued by the authorization server, and the latter's knowledge of the SA state is more current than that of the resource server. Consequently, ex[sessid] is reset. Line 5 corresponds to the case when the capability captures an SA state that is older than what the resource server knows. The capability is therefore rejected. The fall-through case of lines 3-6 is when t ser equals last(ex[sessid]), meaning that the capability is as current as the knowledge of the resource server, and nothing needs to be done in this case.
Lines 7-9 handle requests that involve the exercising of stationary permissions. No new ticket is issued.
Lines 10-18 specify the case when the request involves a transitioning permission. The permission is exercised, and the transition is recorded in ex[sessid] (line 13). The provided SA fragment is then used for computing the next SA fragment (line 14). A new capability is issued for the new SA fragment (line 18). Line 16 will be discussed below under the heading Update Requests.
If the permission requested is neither stationary nor transitioning, then the request is denied (line 19).
Update
Requests. An update request is issued when the SA fragment embedded in the capability does not provide enough information for the resource server to construct the next capability (line 16). The client is expected to take the update request to the authorization server, so that the latter can update its record of the current SA state. The authorization server will only accept an update request ⟨⟨sessid : upd(e)⟩⟩ k,uid if first(e) = serial [ Garbage Collection. The resource server accumulates exception information in ex[·] due to the creation of new sessions and exercising transitioning permissions. Tracking exception information strains the resource server, which is hosted on constrained hardware. That is why "garbage collection" needs to be performed from time to time. This involves the resource server (a) sending the contents of ex[·] (e.g., encoded as a JSON object) to the authorization server, (b) resetting ex[·] to an empty map, and (c) setting t rs to the current time (i.e., time of garbage collection).
Step (c) invalidates the tickets issued prior to garbage collection, forcing clients to obtain fresh capabilities from the authorization server.
Upon receiving ex[·], the authorization server updates the SA state on record for each sessid defined in ex[·]. More specifically, state[sessid] is updated to δ * (state[sessid], ex[sessid]), and serial[sessid] to the time of garbage collection.
Ticket Recovery. Clients are unreliable, and may accidentally misplace tickets. As tickets contain crucial information for the proper execution of the protocol, two mechanisms of ticket recovery are in place.
First, a client may contact the authorization server, and have the capability with serial number serial[sessid] reissued. The SA fragment of that capability is fragment[monitor[sessid], state[sessid]]. This is the standard means for obtaining a working capability after garbage collection.
The method above may not be sufficient for recovering the latest tickets. In particular, if transitioning requests have already been made since serial[sessid], then the resource server has issued more recent tickets. So a second ticket recovery mechanism is in place, in which the client may present to the resource server a previously issued capability ⟨⟨sessid : cap(t ser , F )⟩⟩ k,uid , such that t ser ∈ times(ex[sessid]), and then the resource server will use ex[sessid] together with F to reconstruct the latest ticket for sessid (either an update request or a capability). Details of this mechanism are provided in the next section in transition rule T-Rcv. The latest ticket for a session can always be recovered by applying the first and second recovery mechanism in sequence.
Discussions
Authorization server. The authorization server has freedom to construct any SA fragment as fragment[M, q] so long as the fragment is safe for M in q. The following are some possibilities: That is, all transition targets are unknown. Such a capability describes only the stationary and transitioning permissions (via SP and dom(trans) respectively) of the current SA state. This results in highly lightweight capabilities, and the processing overhead for the resource server is minimized. An update request will be returned every time a transitioning permission is exercised, thereby forcing the client to communicate with the authorization server whenever a transition occurs. • Capabilities may be constructed to capture several levels of transition. For example, if it is known that the most frequent transitions will oscillate among a small number of states, then that region of the transition diagram can be embedded in the capability. Update requests will be returned infrequently. • If M is small, then the entire specification can be captured in the capability. No update requests will ever be returned.
Resource server. There are two approaches to decide when garbage collection should be triggered: (1) Garbage collection can be invoked on regular intervals (e.g., every 8 hours). This ensures that sessions that are no longer active will not occupy resources indefinitely. (2) Garbage collection can also be invoked when ex[·] reaches a certain size threshold, or when one of the exception lists exceeds a certain length threshold. With this approach, ex[·] is guaranteed to never grow beyond a predetermined capacity.
A combination of both approaches is recommended for a realistic implementation: perform garbage collection in regular intervals as well as when the capacity/length threshold is reached.
SECURITY GUARANTEES
Replay attacks are the main security concern for HCAP: Is it possible for the client to gain illegal access by presenting a previously issued capability to a resource server after the SA has already transitioned to a state q in which that capability is no longer representative of q.
In this section, we formulate a formal model for an HCAP protocol session, and demonstrate that replay attacks are impossible (Safety).
We also demonstrate that the protocol is resilient to unreliable clients who misplace tickets (Liveness).
We model the HCAP protocol as a state transition system. Each protocol state captures the state of the entire distributed authorization system, including the internal states of the authorization server, the resource server and the client. A protocol state transition occurs when the protocol participants interact with one another. The main goal of verification is to establish a correspondence between the distributed authorization system and a reference monitor that runs in a centralized system (Theorem 4.2).
Our state transition model abstracts away the following aspects of HCAP: (1) Ticket forging is not modelled as we assume that it is adequately prevented by authentication tags. (2) As protocol sessions are independent from one another, the model specifies the behaviour of one protocol session only. (3) We omit the minor detail of ex[sessid] becoming undefined after garbage collection.
Protocol States. Throughout this section, we assume that M = (Σ, Q, q 0 , δ ) is the SA for the protocol session being modelled. We further assume that the authorization server has pre-computed, for each state q ∈ Q, an SA fragment F M,q that is safe for M in q. • The authorization server state A is a pair (q as , t as ), where q as ∈ Q is the state of M last known by the authorization server, and t as ∈ N is the time when the above knowledge is registered by the authorization server. • The resource server state R is a pair (t rs , e rs ), where t rs ∈ N is the minimum serial number for capabilities that the resource server considers valid, and exception e rs records the transitioning permissions that have been exercised by the resource server since M enters into state q as . • The client state C is the set of tickets that have been issued to the client throughout the protocol session. A ticket tic is of one of two forms: (a) an update request upd(e), where e is of the form ex(p, t, e ′ ), or (b) a capability cap(t ser , F ). Let Γ(M) be the set of all protocol states γ of the above form.
Initial State. The protocol is intended to begin at the initial state γ 0 = (2, A 0 , R 0 , ∅) where A 0 = (q 0 , 1), R 0 = (1, nil(0)). where p is a permission, tic is a ticket, and Ts is a set of tickets. Let Λ(M) be the set of all transition identifiers induced by M.
We specify below a transition relation · · − − → · ⊆ Γ(M) × Λ(M) × Γ(M). The relation is specified in terms of transition rules, which identify the conditions under which (t clo , A, R, C)
as , t ′ as ), and R ′ = (t ′ rs , e ′ rs ). By default, t ′ clo = t clo + 1, A ′ = A, R ′ = R and C ′ = C, unless the rules explicitly say otherwise.
T-Iss The authorization server issues a capability to the client.
The client requests to exercise a stationary permission.
Precondition: λ = request(p, tic), tic ∈ C, tic = cap(t ser , F ), t ser ≥ t rs , t ser ≥ last(e rs ), F = (defs, n ⋆ ), defs(n ⋆ ) = (SP, _), p ∈ SP. Effect: e ′ rs = nil(t ser ) if t ser > last(e rs ). T-ReqT The client requests to exercise a transitioning permission. Precondition: λ = request(p, tic), tic ∈ C, tic = cap(t ser , F ), t ser ≥ t rs , t ser ≥ last(e rs ), F = (defs, n ⋆ ), defs(n ⋆ ) = (_, trans), p ∈ dom(trans). Effect: First, e ′ rs = ex(p, t clo , e 0 ), where e 0 = nil(t ser ) if t ser > last(e rs ), or e 0 = e rs if t ser = last(e rs ). Second, ∆(F , p) ) otherwise.
T-Fsh Garbage collection.
Precondition: λ = flush(). Effect: First, t ′ as = t clo , t ′ rs = t clo , and e ′ rs = nil(last(e rs )). Second, q ′ as = δ * (q as , e rs ) if t as = first(e rs ). T-Upd The client updates the internal state of the authorization server. Precondition: λ = update(tic), tic ∈ C, tic = upd(e), and first(e) = t as . Effect: t ′ as = t clo , q ′ as = δ * (q as , e). T-Rcv The client asks the resource server to recover a lost ticket.
Precondition: λ = recover(tic), tic ∈ C, tic = cap(t ser , F ), and t ser ∈ times(e rs ). Effect: Let F ′ = ∆ * >t ser (F , e rs ). There are three cases.
T-Drp The client accidentally drops some of its tickets.
Precondition: λ = drop(Ts), Ts ⊆ C. Effect: C ′ = C \ Ts. Appendix A of [38] enumerates the state invariants that are satisfied by the initial state and perserved by the state transition relation.
Security Properties. Consider protocol state γ = (t clo , A, R, C), where A = (q as , t as ) and R = (t rs , e rs ), such that γ satisfies the state invariants in [38, Appendix A] . The effective SA state of protocol state γ , denoted eff(γ ), is q as if t as > last(e rs ), or δ * (q as , e rs ) otherwise. The internal states of the authorization and resource server is a distributed representation of the effective SA state. The main theorem below asserts that the distributed authorization system mimics the behaviour of the centralized reference monitor that M represents. A proof of the theorem above can be found in [38, Appendix B] . The next theorem asserts that the client can eventually obtain a working capability (before garbage collection occurs), even if tickets are misplaced. 
, C ′ ), and C ′ contains a capability cap(t ser , _) for which t ser ≥ t rs and t ser ≥ last(e ′ rs ).
A proof of liveness is given in [38, Appendix B ].
MULTIPLE RESOURCE SERVERS
We have been assuming that, when the client requests the authorization server to grant access to a pool of resources, the entire pool is guarded by a single resource server. This section presents an extension to HCAP for accommodating resource pools guarded by multiple resource servers. Every resource server has a unique identifier rsid. We write k rsid to denote the shared secret established between the resource server rsid and the authorization server. In §3.1, a permission is defined to be an operation-resource pair. We assume that the resource identifier within a permission p also identifies the resource server RS(p) that holds the named resource, and that it takes only O(1) time to reconstruct RS(p) from p. (This is true if the resource is identified by a URI, as in the implementation reported in §6.) New Concepts. Our design of the multiple resource servers extension aims to preserve the security guarantees of §4. To this end, the design is based on three concepts.
(1) Baton holding. A global invariant is that, at most one resource server tracks the exception list ex[sessid] for a session sessid. That resource server is said to be "holding the baton (i.e., ex[sessid]) for session sessid. " This allows the security proofs in §4 to (mostly) transfer to this new setting, with one exception. Suppose a resource server rsid does not hold the baton for sessid. Then a malicious client may replay to rsid an outdated capability for sessid. The resource server would not be able to differentiate between the following two cases: Is it the case that (i) no resource server holds the baton (i.e., the baton is garbage collected), or (ii) another resource server holds the baton (a replay attack)? Therefore, in the extended HCAP scheme, the authorization server tracks an additional boolean flag for each session to differentiate between (i) and (ii).
(2) Remote capability validation. A capability cap for session sessid is signed by a specific shared secret, say k rsid 1 , so that only rsid 1 knows how to check the hash value of cap. Capability validation also involves consulting ex[·], and thus rsid 1 needs to hold the baton for sessid as well. When cap is presented along an access request to a resource server rsid 2 different from rsid 1 , rsid 2 will now have to request rsid 1 to perform capability validation on its behalf (aka remote capability validation).
To facilitate remote capability validation, a capability now has the form ⟨⟨vid, sessid : cap(t ser , F )⟩⟩ k,uid . The new element vid explicitly identifies the resource server who knows the secret key k. In other words, k = k vid , and thus vid can validate the capability.
To preserve the efficiency of stationary transitions, we further assume the SA satisfies the property below:
Intuitively, transitions going into a state are triggered by permissions that can be exercised on the same resource server. Consequently, exercising a stationary permission never causes remote capability validation (and baton passing, see below). This ensures stationary transitions are always efficient. Property (1) also makes it natural to associate a resource server RS(q) to every state q: transitions into q can always be conducted on resource server RS(q).
(3) Baton passing. When rsid 2 requests rsid 1 to perform remote capability validation, rsid 1 will pass ex[sessid] to rsid 2 after validation succeeds. This step is known as baton passing. The intention is that stationary transitions performed on rsid 2 after that point will be efficient (i.e., not involving remote capability validation).
Server States and Session Initialization.
In addition to monitor[·], state[·], serial[·] and fragment[·, ·], the authorization server maintains a boolean flag baton[sessid] for each session sessid. The invariant is that baton[sessid] is true if and only if at least one of the resource servers has the baton for sessid (i.e., ex[sessid] is defined on that resource server). When a new session sessid starts, the authorization server sets baton[sessid] to false, since ex[sessid] is not yet defined on any resource server.
Authorization. When a request (uid, p, ⟨⟨vid, sessid : cap(t ser , F )⟩⟩ k,uid ) is presented to a resource server rsid, authorization is performed via Algorithm 2, which is composed of three sections.
(1) The first section, consisting of line 1 only, has no counterpart in Algorithm 1. That line checks whether the resource server rsid can actually exercise the permission p. This check is necessary because p can only be exercised by RS(p).
(2) The second section, made up of lines 2-10, has the same role as lines 1-6 in Algorithm 1. The section validates the integrity of the capability, and initializes ex[sessid] if necessary.
If rsid is specified as the validator, then Algorithm 3 is invoked locally on rsid to perform the validation logic. Algorithm 3 is mostly equivalent to lines 1-6 in Algorithm 1, with one exception. When rsid does not hold the baton (i.e., ex[sessid] is not defined), it is because either (i) no resource server holds the baton, or (ii) another resource server holds the baton. Case (ii) corresponds to a replay attack. This is prevented by lines 3-4 of Algorithm 3, which contact the authorization server to confirm case (i).
If the validator vid is a resource server other than rsid, then rsid requests vid to run Algorithm 3 remotely (line 6). (During remote capability validation, the identifier rsid in Algorithm 3 refers to the validator vid.) If validation succeeds, then the baton is passed to rsid (lines 8-10).
(3) The third section is composed of lines 12-24. This last section of Algorithm 2 plays the same role as lines 7-19 in Algorithm 1. Two points are worth noting. First, the capabilities and update requests issued by rsid are signed by the k rsid instead of k vid (lines 21 & Algorithm 2: Authorize access request (mult. res. servers)
Input: A client access request (uid, p, cap), where uid is the client's authenticated identity, p is the permission to be exercised, and cap is a capability ⟨⟨vid, sessid : cap(t ser , F )⟩⟩ ?,? for session sessid and validator vid, such that F = (defs, n ⋆ ) and defs(n ⋆ ) = (SP, trans). Output: A set of tickets, or a failure response. Data: The resource server maintains the following persistent data: (a) its identity rsid, (b) a secret k rsid it shares with the authorization server, and (c) a map ex[·] that assigns exceptions to session IDs. Baton Compression. Resource servers have different memory capacities, and thus when a large baton is passed, the receiving resource server may not have enough memory to store the baton. This concern is addressed by an implementation technique known as baton compression, which allows us to bound the length of batons by the size of SA fragments.
The key observation is that, when a transition is performed on an SA fragment (Algorithm 2, line 19, ∆(F , p)), the underlying transition diagram (defs) remains unchanged. Thus the transitions recorded in an exception list visit states from the same transition diagram. Eventually, a state will be revisited when the length of the transition history exceeds the number of states in the transition diagram. When this happens, the transition sequence contains a With the baton compression mechanism, when a transitioning permission is exercised by a resource server for a session sessid, the resource server will check that the length of the resulting exception list ex[sessid] does not exceed the number of states in the SA fragment of the capability associated with the request. If the check fails, then the transition history is examined for the presence of loops. Any discovered loops are eliminated, and thus ex[sessid] is "compressed" into a loop-free transition history with a length bounded by the size of the SA fragment stored in the capability of the request. Consequently, baton passing involves only very small payloads with sizes proportional to that of capabilities.
Hard and Soft Garbage Collection. Recall that a design objective of HCAP is to minimize communication with the authorization server (O2). Compared to core HCAP ( §3), the extended protocol has one additional communication with the authorization server: line 3 in Algorithm 3. To make this additional communication an infrequent event, we have devised an optimization technique by enriching the garbage collection mechanism as follows.
When garbage collection is triggered on the resource server, two types of garbage collection may be performed for each session sessid. Session sessid undergoes hard garbage collection when ex[sessid] is reset to undefined (i.e., deallocated). This is the same sort of GC performed by core HCAP. Session sessid undergoes soft garbage collection when ex[sessid] is set to nil(t), where t is the largest timestamp in the exception list ex[sessid] prior to garbage collection. Soft GC clears the exception list without relinquishing the baton (i.e., a nil entry is kept). The resource server is configured in such a way that a session with lots of activities will only undergo soft GC, and a session that has been inactive for an extended time will undergo a hard GC. The effect is that batons are retained for active sessions. Therefore, the extra communication with the authorization server (line 3 of Algorithm 3) is only performed when a session that has remained inactive for an extended time becomes active again. What constitutes "extended time" is a configurable parameter, meaning that the extra communication with the authorization server can be made as infrequently as possible.
As in core HCAP, the garbage-collected (whether hard or soft) exception lists are sent to the authorization server. Along with each exception list, we now have to also indicate, by way of a boolean flag, whether the baton of the corresponding session has been retained (i.e., soft GC). The authorization server will use these boolean flags to update its baton[·] map.
IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTS 6.1 Implementation
We implemented the extended HCAP protocol in Java. 2 The implementation is based on CoAP [36] , a lightweight, UDP-based variant of HTTP commonly used in IoT environments. An HCAP permission in this context is a pair composed of a CoAP method (e.g., GET) and an URI. We rely on the Californium-core library to provide CoAP functionalities. DTLS, which provides TLS-like features for UDP, is used to enable secure communication and mutual authentication. X.509 certificates are used by DTLS for authentication. DTLS features are provided by the Scandium-core library.
Tickets, as well as the contents of ex[·] that are sent during GC, are encoded as either JSON [11] or CBOR [6] objects. JSON is a human readable, lightweight data interchange format which is a subset of the JavaScript Programming Language. CBOR is a variant of JSON that represents data in a compact binary format. We used the jackson-dataformat-cbor and jackson-dataformat-json libraries respectively for CBOR and JSON encoding/decoding.
Our implementation consists of three reusable components (Fig. 1) . The first is a client-side library ("HCAP Client API" in Fig. 1 ), which allows client code to issue HCAP requests to the authorization server and the resource servers. The payload of an HCAP request contains both a capability and the actual payload which the client might want to deliver. Thus our request payload is a JSON map with two keys, mapping to the capability and the actual payload. The second component is a CoAP server that acts as the authorization server ("HCAP Authorization Code" in Fig. 1 ). It offers RESTful services [28] for issuing capabilities, processing update requests, and performing garbage collection. The third component allows IoT vendors to add HCAP access control functionalities to a resource server that runs on the Californium framework. More specifically, we developed a message deliverer for mediating accesses. Within the Californium framework, a message deliverer is a hook method which intercepts a CoAP request before it reaches the intended resource. We developed a custom message deliverer that checks a capability for its validity before passing the request to the resources ("HCAP Access Mediation Code" in Fig. 1) .
CoAP is designed for small data transfers, but sometimes the size of data being transferred might be too large to fit in a single packet (e.g., during garbage collection). In this case we make use of blockwise transfers [7] , another functionality provided by CoAP to segment large chunks of data as blocks and send them over. This allows us to perform garbage collection in an efficient manner. 2 The implementation is available at http://github.com/HCAPDevTeam/hcap. 
Empirical Evaluation
We conducted four experiments to assess the performance of our HCAP implementation. The focus of our empirical study is in assessing the network overhead incurred by HCAP, since the computation involved in the protocol is relatively lightweight. All clients were hosted on a single machine. Each of the authorization and resource servers ran on a separate machine. Experiment 1-3 involves a single resource server, while Experiment 4 involves two resource servers. Clients and the resource servers were hosted on 3.6 Ghz Intel Core i7 (4790) machines with 8 GB of RAM, running Fedora 24 4.8 and OpenJDK Runtime Environment (1.8). The authorization server was hosted on a 2.66 Ghz Intel Xeon(R)(X5355) machine with 24 GB of RAM, running Fedora 22 4.8 and OpenJDK Runtime Environment (1.8). All machines were connected via wired LAN on a 1 Gbps line.
The first communication between the client and the servers takes considerable amount of time, this is due to a DTLS session being established between the two communicating parties. To eliminate this confounding factor, we send a dummy request (ping) to the servers before the experiments start. We used "SHA256withECDSA" to generate signatures, and the key size was 256 bits. Experiment 1: Incomplete SA Fragments. If the SA fragment in a capability does not provide enough information for the resource server to construct its next capability, an update request is returned to the client (Algorithm 2, line 21), causing an extra communication with the authorization server. The purpose of this experiment is to assess the performance impact of incomplete SA fragments.
The experimental protocol session involves an SA M = ({p 0 , p 1 },
In short, p 0 is stationary, and p 1 is transitioning. Every capability issued by the authorization server carries an SA fragment F = (defs, n ⋆ ) for which defs(n ⋆ ) = (SP, trans) and ran(trans) = {•}. In other words, the resource server returns an update request whenever the request involves p 1 . In each experimental configuration, we had a client generating 100 access requests, so that P% of the requests involved p 1 . The client would then bring any update request to the authorization server before the next access request was generated. We repeated this for P = 0, 10, . . . , 100. We measured the average time it took for the client to complete an access request, including the overhead of contacting the authorization server in case an update request was returned.
The results are depicted in Fig. 2(a) . The average request handling time is between 5.5 to 12.3 milliseconds (10 −3 sec), an acceptable range considering that the high-end (12.3 millisec) corresponds to the case when every access request results in an update request (P = 100%). Experiment 2: SA Complexity. The purpose of this experiment is to assess the performance impact of embedding a complex SA in a capability. The experimental protocol sessions involve SA of the following form: M n = (Σ n , Q n , q 0 , δ n ), where Σ n = {p 0 , . . . , p n−1 }, Q n = {q 0 , . . . , q n−1 }, and δ n (q i , p j ) = q j . In short, there is a transition between every ordered pair of states in M n . The SA fragments embedded in capabilities incorporate the full specification of the SA. We varied n from 1 up to 15. For each value of n, a client issued 100 randomly generated access requests to the resource server. We measured the average time for the client to complete one request.
The results are depicted in Fig. 2(b) . As n increases, the number of transitions in M n grows quadratically, so does the size of the SA fragment. When the value of n increased from 12 to 13, we see a sudden jump in the request handling time. This is because, when n ≤ 12, the entire SA fragment can be fitted into a single UDP packet, but multiple packets are needed when n > 13. That was when CoAP blockwise transfer kicked in. This highlights the advantage of keeping SA fragments moderate in size. Experiment 3: Garbage Collection. The purpose of this experiment is to evaluate the performance impact of garbage collection (GC). Reusing the SA M 12 from Experiment 2, we deployed 100 clients to issue transitioning requests to the resource server. As each transitioning request for session sessid was served, a new exception entry was added to ex[sessid]. Once all the requests were issued, GC was triggered, and the entire contents of ex[·] were transfered to the authorization server for updating state[·]. We measured the time for GC to complete. Let R be the total number of requests made by the clients right before GC was triggered. The experiment was repeated for R = 10,000, 20,000, . . . , 100,000. In addition, for each R, the experiment was repeated 100 times to obtain the average GC overhead. These experiments were conducted in two experimental configurations: (1) w/o BC, in which baton compression was turned off, and (2) BC, in which baton compression was turned on. This allowed us to observe how GC interacted with baton compression
The results are depicted in Fig. 2(c) , with the horizontal axis corresponding to R divided by 1,000. Without baton compression (w/o BC), the size of ex[·] grew in proportion to R (i.e., the number of transitioning requests issued to the resource server), and GC time grew accordingly. If we amortize GC time over individual requests, then the per-request GC overhead ranges between 54 and 58 microseconds (10 −6 sec), that is, between 0.78% and 0.83% of the average request handling time (Experiment 2, n = 12).
When baton compression was turned on (BC), the overhead of garbage collection was significantly reduced. This was because the length of an exception list ex[sessid] is bounded by 12 (i.e., the number of states in M 12 ). Thus the total size of ex[·] is never above 12 × 100 = 1, 200. Amortizing the GC overhead over individual requests, the per-request GC overhead ranges between 0.72 and 7.5 microseconds (10 −6 sec), that is, between 0.01% and 0.10% of the average request handling time.
Experiment 4: Baton Passing. The purpose of this experiment is to evaluate the performance impact of baton passing. Two resource servers were involved. The SA M 2 from Experiment 2 was reused, so that the two resource servers played the role of RS(q 0 ) and RS(q 1 ) respectively. Consequently, baton passing was triggered when and only when a transitioning permission was exercised. A single client was configured to issue a total of 1,000 requests to the resource servers, so that P% of the requests involved baton passing. The experiment was repeated for P = 0, 10, . . . , 100. The average time required to complete one authorization request was recorded for each P. In addition, the experiments were conducted in four different experimental configurations, so that we could observe how the overhead of baton passing was affected by garbage collection and baton compression:
(1) No GC/BC. Both garbage collection and baton compression were turned off.
(2) GC/400. Garbage collection was triggered after every 400 transitioning requests, but baton compression was turned off.
(3) GC/100. This configuration is similar to GC/400 except that garbage collected was triggered after every 100 requests.
(4) BC. Baton compression was turned on, but garbage collection was turned off.
The results are depicted in Fig. 2(d) . In the case of No GC/BC, the baton sizes (i.e., lengths of exception lists) grew indefinitely because neither garbage collection nor baton compression was turned on. Therefore, baton passing incurred significant overhead (approximately 60 milliseconds per authorization request when P = 100%). Turning on garbage collection (GC/400 and GC/100) significantly reduced the overhead of baton passing, because a Session: Research Track-IoT SACMAT'18, June 13-15, 2018, Indianapolis, IN, USA baton was reduced to empty every time it was garbage collected, and thus batons were never given the chance to grow too long. We also notice that the more frequently garbage collection was triggered (e.g., more frequently in GC/100 than in GC/400), the overhead of baton passing became smaller. The most promising result, however, is that of BC, in which baton compression was turned on (even without the help of GC): it took only 6 milliseconds to complete an authorization request even when P = 100%. This is because the batons (i.e., exception lists) are kept to a size of 2 (M 2 has only two states). In this case, baton passing involved only the sending of a single UDP packet.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We argued that the physical embeddedness and process awareness of IoT devices impose a natural sequencing of accesses, which can be exploited for realizing Least Privilege. To this end, we proposed HCAP, a distributed capability system for enforcing history-based access control policies in a decentralized manner. We formally established the security guarantees of HCAP and empirically demonstrated that the performance of HCAP is competitive.
The following are some directions for future work: (1) integrating HCAP into UMA or OpenID, (2) adding fault tolerance into HCAP, (3) compilation of workflow specification and/or UMP specification [4] into SA fragments for use in HCAP, and (4) incorporating context awareness (e.g., time, location, sensor inputs) into HCAP.
